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DEFENDANT ACCESS TO PROSECUTION WITNESS
STATEMENTS IN FEDERAL AND STATE
CRIMINAL CASES
Overburdened criminal dockets of federal and state courts across the
United States demand discovery' procedures that ensure optimal use of
court time while promoting just disposition of cases. One aspect of
criminal discovery--the timing of defendant access to prosecution wit-
ness statements-plays a significant role in criminal prosecutions.
In 1957, Congress enacted the Jencks Act,' which affords defendants
in federal criminal cases the right to obtain a prosecution witness' prior
statements only after the witness has testified on direct examination at
trial While fourteen states similarly deny access to such statements
I. In the context of this Note, the term "discovery" refers to the receipt of information by
the defense, and the term "disclosure" refers to prosecutorial relinquishment of information to the
defense.
2. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
3. The Jencks Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report
in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or
prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of sub-
poena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in
the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire
contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the wit-
ness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination
and use.
(c) . . .Whenever any statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to this section,
the court in its discretion, upon application of said defendant, may recess proceedings in
the trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination
of such statement by said defendant and his preparation for its use in the trial.
(e) The term "statement," as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section in
relation to any witness called by the United States, means-
1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by him;
2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said
witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or
3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made
by said witness to a grand jury.
Id
Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1,
1980, placed in the criminal rules the substance of the Jencks Act. In addition, Rule 26.2 provides
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until after direct testimony,4 the remaining states afford access to prose-
cution witness statements at various stages of the judicial process.'
Part I of this Note provides a brief summary of the traditional argu-
ments favoring and opposing criminal discovery. Part II examines fed-
eral and state enactments withholding defendants' access to prior
statements of prosecution witnesses until after direct testimony at trial.
Part III explores state enactments allowing discovery of such state-
ments prior to the witness' direct testimony.6 Part IV discusses access
to witness statements in those states in which discovery of such state-
ments is governed by case law.7
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At common law there existed no right to discovery of the name or
testimony of any prosecution witness.8 Statutes enacted in the late
for production of the statements of defense witnesses at trial in essentially the same manner as is
now provided for with respect to the statements of government witnesses. The Advisory Commit-
tee notes that follow the rule, however, state that the rule is not intended to discourage earlier
voluntary disclosure. The Committee reasoned that such early disclosure will avoid delays at
trial. The Rule also requires disclosure of statements in the possession of either party when the
witness is called by the court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
26.2.
4. The states which allow defendants access to prosecution witness statements after direct
testimony are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Wyoming. See infra notes 67-93 and
accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 104-05, 116-17, 123, 133 & 141-64 and accompanying text. Georgia and
Virginia appear to deviate from the textual statement. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying
text. The positions taken by the states on the timing of defendant access to prosecution witness
statements is presented in chart form in the Appendix to this Note.
6. Pretrial discovery is viewed as a sub-class of predirect testimony discovery for the pur-
pose of this Note. Thus, the Rules of Criminal Procedure and federal and state statutes dealing
with pretrial discovery are considered in par! materia with those aimed at jredirect testimony
discovery. Although pretrial discovery rules are inoperative once the trial begins, the seminal
consideration in this Note is defendant access to prosecution witness's prior statements at some
time before the witness takes the stand versus access after the direct testimony of the witness at
trial. The defense counsel's responsibility to take advantage of pretrial discovery procedures and
the consequences of his failure to do so are matters beyond the scope of this Note.
7. For a compilation of pretrial discovery rules across the country in 1971, see Zagel & Carr,
State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557, 600 app. a.
8. See, eg., Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). Responding to a motion for
discovery of a report on which the charges against the defendant were based, the court stated:
Nor was such a motion as the present ever made; and if we were to grant it, it would
subvert the whole system of criminal law. . . . And if we were to assume a discretionary
power of granting this request, it would be dangerous in the extreme, and totally un-
founded on precedent.
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries introduced the use of prelimi-
nary hearings and marked the beginning of criminal discovery in
England.'
In the United States, the extent of defendants' access to statements of
Government witnesses in federal criminal prosecutions prior to 1957
was governed primarily by appellate court decisions. 10 Similarly, most
states left the development of criminal discovery to the judiciary.1"
Traditionally, little, if any, formal discovery has been available to the
criminal defendant.' 2
Among the early objections to criminal discovery, the most often
cited was the possibility that severe penalties would motivate criminal
defendants to procure perjured testimony and to fabricate defenses. 1P
Opponents argued that criminal discovery thus served to thwart honest
fact-finding rather than to promote justice. Opponents further argued
that discovery of the identity of prosecution witnesses might result in
bribery or intimidation of the witnesses by the defendant or his
Id at 1249-50.
9. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1850 n.l (Chadbourn rev. 1976). See generally Traynor,
Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 749, 750-54 (1964)
(discussing the origin of the preliminary hearing in England and its use as a discovery device).
10. See, ag., United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944). The Second Circuit
initiated the practice of requiring Government documents to be produced for a determination of
their relevancy and materiality for impeachment purposes. See United States v. Grayson, 166
F.2d 863, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Beckman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946);
United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 799 (1944); United
States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1944). See generally 11 STAN. L. REV. 297, 297-
301 (1959); 67 YALE LJ. 674 (1958).
11. See 8 FoRDHAM UaB. L.J. 731,731 (1980). See generally 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 89, 89-90
(1972).
12. See, eg., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). In Goldman, the accused was
denied the right before trial to inspect notes and memoranda of federal agents made during their
investigation. The Supreme Court declared that "[t]he judge was clearly right in his ruling... as
the petitioners should not have had access, prior to trial, to material constituting a substantial
portion of the Government's case." Id at 132. See also Blevins v. State, 220 Ga. 720, 722-23, 141
S.E.2d 426, 429 (1965); State v. Spica, 389 S.W.2d 35, 51-52 (Mo. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 972
(1966); Melchor v. State, 404 P.2d 63, 68 (Okla. 1965).
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mead, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 167, 170 (1858); State v. Tune, 13
NJ. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955); State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio
St. 397, 423-24, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910). See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1863. In Eng-
land, criminal defendants were not given the right to call witnesses and to present a defense until
1867. Traynor, supra note 9, at 753. See generally Guzman, Arkansas' 1971 Criminal Discovery
Ac, 26 ARK. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1972); Zagel & Carr, supra note 7, at 560-61; 8 FoRDHAM URB. LJ.
731, 731-33 (1980).
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accomplices.14
Some opponents of criminal discovery believed that the defendant's
right to remain silent, coupled with the prosecution's burden to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, afforded the defendant every advan-
tage.'5 Thus, they argued, allowing the defendant access to the prose-
cution's evidence would serve only to obstruct the prosecution of crime.
This opposition to criminal discovery eventually became the subject
of critical commentary. One commentator described the argument that
defense discovery would invite perjury'6 as a "hobgoblin" and a "com-
plete fallacy,"' 7 because there was no evidence that discovery in crimi-
nal cases would result in a greater incidence of perjury and
fabrication.'" Furthermore, proponents of criminal discovery assert
that the danger of misuse of discovered evidence by the dishonest de-
fendant in no way justifies refusing the honest defendant a fair and
effective means of preparing an adequate defense.' 9 Proponents also
criticize the perjury argument as an insult to the criminal defense bar
because it implies that defense attorneys will encourage perjury once
14. See, eg., State v. Tune, 13 NJ. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
907 (1955); People v. DiCarlo, 161 Misc. 484, 485-86, 292 N.Y.S. 252, 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
15. See, e.g., May, Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. Rev. 642, 661
(1876) ("[It may fairly be said, that, so soon as a man is arrested on a charge of crime, the law
takes the'prisoner under its protection, and goes about to see how his conviction may be pre-
vented ... ").
In United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) Judge Learned Hand stated:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution
is held rigidly to the charge, he [the defendant] need not disclose the barest outline of his
defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted
when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition
he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and
make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see .... Our dangers do
not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always been haunted by
the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is
the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the
prosecution of crime.
Id at 649.
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Questfor Truth?, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 279, 291.
18. See United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court described
the argument as being built on "untested folklore."
19. See, eg., 6 J. WtGMoun, supra note 9, at § 1863 ("That argument [that pretrial discovery
will result in perjury and fabricated defenses] is outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic)
for the one-time refusal of the criminal law ... to allow the accused to produce any witnesses at
all.").
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discovery is obtained.2°
In response to the witness intimidation argument, 2' proponents for-
ward the availability of protective orders and other sanctions within the
discretion of the trial court as effective safeguards when circumstances
appear to justify secrecy.22 For example, when it is apparent that a
defendant may subject a witness to economic harm, physical injury or
other coercion, the trial court in its discretion may properly deny a de-
fense request for disclosure of the witness' name and address.23 More-
over, commentators rebut the claim that the accused has the advantage
in criminal prosecutions by noting that the prosecution has the investi-
gative advantages of manpower and facilities.24
In sum, proponents argue that a criminal defendant who faces the
loss of liberty should, in the interest of fairness, be accorded at least the
same rights of discovery as those allowed the civil defendant.25 Fur-
thermore, the presumption of innocence mandates discovery in crimi-
nal cases: if the defendant is presumed innocent he must be presumed
to have no personal knowledge of the crime charged.26 Proponents also
20. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 17, at 29 1-92.
21. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 17, at 292; Traynor, supra note 9, at 250.
23. See, e.g., FLA. R. CIuM. P. 3.220(h).
24. See, e.g., Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1968) (possibility of unfair-
ness arising from prosecution's superior resources is a weakness of the adversary system);
Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models ofCriminal Procedure: 4 Compara-
tive Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 533-36 (1973); Zagel & Carr, supra note 13, at 560-61. Gener-
ally, the prosecution's investigative capability outweighs that of the defense in terms of manpower
and facilities. In addition, the accused often gives the prosecution a statement or confession or is
forced to appear in a line-up. Id
Professor Goldstein points out that even the defendant who uses his own resources to locate
witnesses who have spoken to the police, prosecutor or grand jury will probably find that such
witnesses are unwilling to talk with him. Goldstein, The State andthe Accused Balance ofAdvan-
tage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1182 (1960). Professor Goldstein suggests that the
wide discrepancy between prosecution and defense investigative resources could easily be over-
come if the accused were allowed access to state equipment and files. Id at 1182 n. 10.
25. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1193 ("Every one of the many excellent arguments
which carried the day for pretrial discovery in civil cases is equally applicable on the criminal
side."); Pye, The Defendant's Casefor More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 83 (1963) (defendant
usually unable to recall every detail of the transaction, unaware of the names of all the witnesses
or what they have said in prior statements and does not possess all the evidence which may be
relevant at his trial).
26. Zagel & Carr, supra note 13, at 560. See also Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Crimi-
nal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293, 372 (1960) ("Criminal prosecution is not designed to determine
the better of two contestants; to argue that we should not afford the defendant a certain degree of
discovery because it gives him a better chance to win is to assume he is guilty.").
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claim that pretrial discovery promotes the ends of justice and the
search for truth by ensuring the exposure of all relevant facts at trial
and by eliminating the use of surprise tactics.27 This improves the effi-
ciency of criminal justice administration and assures the defendant of
his right to a fair trial by enabling him to adequately prepare his de-
fense.28 Finally, proponents contend that pretrial discovery econo-
mizes the use of court time by allowing the accused to weigh the
evidence and determine whether to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty
in the context of plea-bargaining.
29
II. DISCLOSURE AFTER DIRECT TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
-4. The Jencks Decision and Subsequent Legislation
In 1957, in Jencks v. United States,30 the Supreme Court announced
for the first time the accused's right to obtain confidential statements
made by government witnesses in federal criminal prosecutions. The
Jencks Court held that upon motion to the court, a defendant is enti-
tled, for impeachment purposes, to an order directing the prosecution
to produce for the defendant's inspection all relevant statements or re-
ports in its possession of Government witnesses touching on the subject
matter of their testimony at trial.3 ' Furthermore, the Court held that a
defendant is not required to lay a prior foundation of inconsistency
between the reports and testimony of the witnesses.
32
27. See Fletcher, supra note 26. But see Pulaski, Criminal Trials: A "Search for Truth" or
Something Else 16 CiuM. L. BULL. 41 (1980). Professor Pulaski posits that the perception of a
criminal trial as a search for truth is misguided. He suggests that the criminal trial should be
thought of as a "guilt determining process." Id at 45.
28. See, e.g., Pye, supra note 25; Zagel & Carr, supra note 13.
29. See Zagel & Carr, supra note 13.
30. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
31. Id at 668. Justice Clark, in dissent, warned that the Jencks majority had opened the files
of the United States intelligence agencies, affording the criminal "a Roman holiday for rummag-
ing through confidential information as well as vital national secrets." Id at 681-82.
32. Id at 666-68. "Foundation" in this context refers to a demonstration to the court that
material within the documents in the Government's possession is inconsistent with the trial testi-
mony of the witness. Id The Court stated that sufficient foundation was established by the Gov-
ernment witnesses' (undercover agents for the F.B.I.) testimony that their reports concerned
matters about which they had testified. Id at 666.
The Court disapproved of the practice of production of Government documents to the trial
judge for his determination of their relevancy and materiality for impeachment purposes, stating
that the defense alone is capable of determining what use may be made of such documents. Id at
668-69. The Court stated that the trial judge's admissibility determinations should be made only
after inspection by the accused. Id at 669.
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The Jencks decision, however, failed to delimit the scope of the dis-
covery right accorded to criminal defendants.33 Absent Supreme Court
guidance, lower courts rendered conflicting opinions on the scope and
timing of production.34 In response, the 85th Congress enacted the
Jencks Act,35 to prevent abuses it feared would result from expansive
interpretations of Jencks.36 Congress intended the Act to protect both
the rights of the criminally accused and confidential information in the
Government's possession.37  The Act rigidly prescribes the time at
which the accused may obtain relevant matter: discovery, upon motion
of the defendant,38 is allowed only after the witness has testified upon
direct examination.39 Congress expressly provided for discretionary
postponement of trial proceedings subsequent to disclosure of a witness
statement, to afford defense counsel an opportunity to examine the
statement for possible use during trial.'
The timing provision of the Jencks Act may be criticized on several
grounds. The most effective witness impeachment occurs when cross-
examination immediately follows direct examination.4 ' Production of
33. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1959).
34. A majority of these courts limited production of prosecution witness statements until af-
ter direct testimony of the witness at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Grado, 154 F. Supp. 878
(W.D. Mo. 1957); United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.N.J. 1957); United States v.
Anderson, 154 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 764 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
929 (1959); United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), a 'd, 258 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). In many cases, however, the defense relied on Jencks to justify
demands for pretrial production of government files. United States v. Palermo, 360 U.S. 343, 346.
For a discussion of problematic cases in the lower federal courts after Jencks, see H. REP. No. 700,
85th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1957) (statement of Attorney General Brownell) and S. REP. No. 981,
85th Cong. 1st Sess. (1957).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). See supra note 3.
36 The fear of abuses and the need for congressional action was first expressed by Justice
Clark in his dissent inJencks. 353 U.S. at 681-82. A student author, however, has advocated that
"the prosecutor's entire file should, except in special cases, be open to defense inspection." 40 U.
CHI. L. REv. 112, 113 (1972). For a full discussion of the Jencks legislation, its legislative history,
and congressional intent, see 11 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1959); 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
37. S. RE.P No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1957). The Jencks Act is premised on the
desire of Congress to protect potential witnesses from threats of bribery or coercion and to protect
government files against unwarranted and excessive intrusions. See, e.g., United States v. Walk,
533 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Feinberg, 502 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1974), ceri. denied,
420 U.S. 926 (1975); United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1976).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976). See United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich.
1977) for an example of early disclosure of Jencks Act materials ordered by the trial court.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1976).
41. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1884 (Chadbourn rev. 1976):
The cross-examination, or examination by the party not calling the witness,follows im-
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prior statements under the Jencks Act after direct examination fol-
lowed by a recess, however, may deprive the defendant of maximum
benefit from cross-examination. 42 Pretrial discovery, in contrast, would
provide the defense with more time to examine the witness statements,
and knowledge of their content prior to direct examination would aid
in recognition of inconsistencies as they develop.4 3 Moreover, recesses
inherent in the Jencks Act timing requirement result in trial delays and
wasted court time."
B. United States v. Algie
In United States v. Aigie, 45 the Eastern District of Kentucky relaxed
the literal time requirements of the Jencks Act 46 and ordered predirect
testimony disclosure of Government witness statements. 7 Although
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order of the district
court,48 District Judge Bertelsman's lengthy opinion provides a useful
analysis of the shortcomings of the Jencks Act timing requirement. 49
The district court reasoned that the Jencks Act, adopted in 1959,
must be read inpari materia with the Federal Rules of Evidence50 and
mediately the direct examination, in the customary order prescribed by the common law
Since the purpose of this immediate sequence is to furnish the tribunal with the means
of fixing the net significance of the witness' testimony while the tenor of his direct testi-
mony is fresh in their minds, it seems proper enough to hold that the opponent is entitled
to this immediate sequence, in order to expose without delay the weak points of the testi-
mony against him. (emphasis in original).
42. See generally 67 YALE Li. 674 (1958).
43. Id at 696-97.
44. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
45. 503 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1980), rev'd, 667 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982). Algie involved an
alleged interstate gambling conspiracy with "voluminous documentary evidence" to be inter-
preted by Government witnesses. 503 F. Supp. at 785 n.2.
46. See supra note 3 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976).
47. The prosecutor was required to produce Jencks Act statements of government agents and
police officials five days prior to the beginning of trial, and statements of other witnesses the night
before they were scheduled to testify. 503 F. Supp. at 789-90.
48. 667 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982).
49. For other cases in which the trial court ordered early disclosure of Jencks Act materials,
see United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); United States v. Fine, 413 F.
Supp. 740 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
50. 503 F. Supp. at 795-96. The court focused on Federal Rules of Evidence 102, 403, and
611 (a) which read as follows:
Rule 102. Purpose and Construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of un-
justifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
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other subsequent acts of Congress, including the Speedy Trial Act of
1974.51 According to the.A/gie court, Congress, in adopting the Rules
of Evidence, accorded the federal district courts broad discretion to
manage their dockets. 2 Such discretion, reasoned the court, included
the freedom to relax the literal time requirements of the Jencks Act. 3
The court characterized the Speedy Trial Act as a congressional direc-
tive that courts, in managing their dockets, use all necessary means to
dispose of the cases before them. 4 Judge Bertelsman noted that in
1959, Congress undoubtedly was aware of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct which requires a judge to insist that court officials, litigants, and
their lawyers cooperate with the judge in handling the court's business
promptly.5 Judge Bertelsman concluded that in light of these enact-
ments, the Jencks Act must be read56 as permitting courts to exercise
discretion to adjust the time limitations of the Act. Otherwise, he ar-
gued, courts would be precluded from discharging their obligations in
complex criminal cases such as A/gie 7
The Algie court also noted that the United States Attorney previ-
ously had agreed to early production of Jencks Act statements in order
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Rule 61 1(a). Control by Court.
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
The court stated that when construed according to standard rules of statutory construction the
Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by special act of Congress, Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926, supercede or implicitly amend previous enactments contrary to them. 503 F.
Supp. at 791.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976).
52. 503 F. Supp. at 796.
53. Id
54. Id at 796-97.
55. Id at 797.
56. For the court's discussion of its application of accepted rules of statutory construction, see
id at 796 n.41.
57. Id at 797. Judge Bertelsman concluded that "[i]nasmuch as the drastic sanction of exclu-
sion of the evidence is expressly provided for in Rule 403, the less drastic sanction of compelling
compliance with conditions to remove or alleviate the prejudicial or time-wasting aspects of the
introduction of the evidence is also authorized." Id at 793. See supra note 50 for the text of Rule
403.
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to expedite criminal cases. 8 Early production shortened trials by an
average of one-third to one-half.5 9 In addition, although the parties did
not plea bargain, many cases resulted in guilty pleas.60
In summary, in rendering its decision, the trial court inAlgie consid-
ered the following factors: its responsibility to dispose of its business
within a reasonable time,6" a criminal defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel62 and due process of law,63 and the danger of wit-
ness intimidation.' 4 Although the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court order,65 it strongly endorsed voluntary early
disclosure of Jencks Act materials in the interest of expeditious disposi-
tion of criminal cases.66 Thus, the Sixth Circuit recognized that the
58. 503 F. Supp. at 786.
59. Id at 787. At the oral argument in4lgie, the United States Attorney admitted that 20 to
40 minute recesses at the conclusion of the direct examination of each witness are frequently
necessary when Jencks Act timing is literally complied with. Id The court stated that an attorney
cannot adequately prepare the cross-examination of an expert on a complicated matter during a
trial recess. Id at 788. Indeed, argued the court, such a situation may result in the denial of
effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. Id at 789.
60. Id at 787.
61. Id at 797. The Aigie court discussed the serious docket backlog that existed in the East-
ern District of Kentucky. Id at 786.
62. Id at 789 (denial of effective assistance of counsel would result if attorney for the defense
was expected to analyze Jeneks Act statements during recess).
63. The.41gie court quoted with approval from United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252,
270 (E.D. Mich. 1977):
Courts have long recognized that they have inherent power not limited by statute or rule
to insure that due process of law is provided and that criminal trials are fair and efficient.
U.S. v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Cammisano, 413 F. Supp. 886
(W.D. Mo. 1976); U.S. v. Germain, 411 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Ohio 1975); U.S. v.
Winchester, 407 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1975).
503 F. Supp. at 798 (emphasis in original).
64. Id at 785. The court made clear that it was prepared to make exceptions to its order for
early production of Jencks Act statements if the United States Attorney could demonstrate the
presence of such a danger as witness intimidation. .1d at 785, 789.
65. 667 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982).
66. Although compelled to reverse the district court's order by the imperative language of the
Jencks Act, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly approved of the district court's objectives:
We emphasize that we heartily approve of the District Judge's objectives in seeking to
bring about the disposition of his crowded docket, and applaud his efforts in this regard.
We hope that will continue and that he will succeed in securing the maximum coopera-
tion with his trial plans that it is possible to achieve from such voluntary cooperation as
may be had from the United States Attorney.
Id at 571. The court further commented that:
[flor the reasons so ably spelled out by the District Judge in this case, we trust that that
option [early disclosure of Jencks Act materials] will be used freely by the United States
Attorneys in this circuit in all instances where there is not substantial reason for the
prosecution to hold its cards as tightly to its chest as the Jencks Act clearly authorizes it
to do.
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stringent time limitation of the Jencks Act is not necessary in all cases
and may result in needless delays in many cases.
C State Enactments
Several states have statutes and procedural rules governing discovery
of prosecution witness statements patterned after the Jencks Act.67
When confronted with questions requiring the interpretation of such
statutes and rules, those states frequently look to federal case law for
guidance.68
Id at 572.
67. Rule 16(i) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure (Allen Smith, 1981 Supp.)
governs discovery and inspection. The rule is representative of state statutes patterned after the
Jencks Act. Section (i) pertains to demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses:
(1) In any criminal prosecution, no statement or report in the possession of the prose-
cution which was made by a prosecution witness or prospective prosecution witness
(other than the defendant) to an agent of the prosecution is subject to subpoena, discov-
ery, or inspection until the witness has testified on direct examination.
(2) After a witness called by the prosecuting attorney has testified on direct examina-
tion, the court, on motion of the defendant, shall order the prosecuting attorney to pro-
duce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the
prosecution which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.
(5) the term "statement," as used in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) in relation to any
witness called by the prosecuting attorney, means:
(i) a written statement made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted by
him; or
(ii) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other record, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by
the witness to an agent of the prosecution and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of the oral statement.
Note that in contrast with the federal statute, the North Dakota definition of "statement" does not
encompass a statement made to a grand jury.
The following rules and statutes have Jencks-type provisions: ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.45.050-.060,
12.45.160 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2011.3 (1977); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86b (1981); HA-
WAIi R. CRiM. P. 17; KAN. CIaM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 22-3213 (Vernon 1974); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-13-6 to -10 (1979); TENN. R. CiuM. P. 16; Wyo. R. CIuM. P. 18.
For cases applying these statutes, see Putnam v. State, 629 P.2d 35 (Alaska 1980); Blakemore v.
State, 268 Ark. 145, 594 S.W.2d 231 (1980); Williamson v. State, 263 Ark. 401, 565 S.W.2d 415
(1978); Nelson v. State, 262 Ark. 391, 557 S.W.2d 191 (1977); State v. Gilbert, 36 Conn. Supp. 129,
414 A.2d 496 (1979); State v. Maluia, 56 Hawaii 428, 539 P.2d 1200 (1975); State v. Kabinu, 53
Hawaii 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); State v. Campbell, 217 Kan.
756, 539 P.2d 329, cert. denied sub non Docking v. Kansas, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); State v.
Humphrey, 217 Kan. 352, 537 P.2d 155 (1975); State v. Kelly, 216 Kan. 31, 531 P.2d 60 (1975);
State v. Hager, 271 N.W.2d 476 (N.D. 1978); State v. Serl, 269 N.W.2d 785 (S.D. 1978); Janklow v.
Talbott 89 S.D. 179, 231 N.W.2d 837 (1975); State v. Robinson, 618 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1981); State v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837
(Wyo. 1977); Deluna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1972).
68. See, eg., Wright v. State, 501 P.2d 1360 (Alaska 1972) citedin Putnam v. State, 629 P.2d
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Jencks-type state statutes are subject to the same criticisms that the
court identified in United States v. Algie.69 Assuming that the defense
is entitled to a recess to examine the contents of prior statements before
cross-examination, Jencks-type timing of discovery inevitably will
lengthen the trial.70 This results in less than optimal use of valuable
court time.71 Moreover, such recesses may provide insufficient time for
preparation of adequate cross-examination, especially when the case
involves statements of expert witnesses dealing with complex matters.72
This in turn portends potential deprivations of effective assistance of
counsel.73  Finally, recesses following production of Jencks material
35, 43 n.15 (Alaska 1980); State v. Gilbert, 36 Conn. Supp. 129, 414 A.2d 496 (1979); State v.
Kahinu, 53 Hawaii 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); State v, Hager, 271
N.W.2d 476 (N.D. 1978); Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837 (Wyo. 1977).
69. See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
70. TheAlgie court, for example, found that trials were shortened by an average of one-third
to one-half as a result of early production of Jencks Act statements. 503 F. Supp. at 787, rev'd,
United States v. Algie, 667 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Narcisco, 446 F.
Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977). In Narcisco, the district court ordered early production of Jencks
Act statements in order to avoid the many delays that would be occasioned by recesses following
normal production of such statements. The court stated that such recesses would "seriously ham-
per the efficient, orderly and fair conduct of the trial. The subject of the trial will be difficult
enough for the parties, the Court and jurors to assimilate without the added hindrance of numer-
ous delays." 446 F. Supp. at 270. See also Proposed.4mendaents to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Hearings on H. . 7473 and H.R 7817 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House o/Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 1980 (summary of
testimony of the Federal Public and Community Defenders) ("The Jencks Act is a tremendous
obstacle to trial continuity and efficiency. Recesses, mini-hearings and adjournments are regular
results of the Act.")
71. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 336 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The Goldberg court
noted that the pressure to expedite the disposition of criminal cases should be regarded as apply-
ing to prosecutors as well as to judges. Given this consideration the court posited that "[t]he mere
fact that the Jencks Act precludes the Court from ordering disclosure of a witness' statement until
after the witness has testified does not mean that in every case Government counsel should be
unwilling to expedite matters by making these statements available at such times as will eliminate
trial delays .. " Id at 2 (emphasis added). In Goldberg, the statements were furnished in
advance of the trial. Id at 1.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Algie, 503 F. Supp. at 788 (An attorney cannot be expected to
prepare the cross-examination of an expert on a complicated matter during a trial recess).
73. The Arkansas statute, for example, like the Jencks Act, provides that prosecution witness
statements shall not be disclosed until the witness has testified on direct examination. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-2011.3 (1977). Notwithstanding the imperative language of that statute, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas, in 1978, held that Rules 17.1 and 19.4 of the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure call for pretrial disclosure of prosecution witness statements to reduce delays
during trial by allowing defense counsel to plan cross-examination. Williamson v. State, 263 Ark.
401, 404, 565 S.W.2d 415, 417-18 (1978).
ARK. R. CRim. P. 17.1 provides:
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may diminish substantially the effectiveness of defense counsel's cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses.74
Connecticut, pursuant to a Jencks-type statute,75 allows production
of prior witness statements only to the extent that such statements di-
rectly relate to the actual issues or events about which the witness has
testified.76 Thus, Connecticut affords the defendant access to prosecu-
tion witnesses' prior statements only if the defendant can demonstrate
that the witness previously made a statement inconsistent with his trial
testimony.
A witness' prior statement that does not directly relate to trial testi-
mony, however, may be a valuable source upon which to build effective
cross-examination. For example, cross-examination tending to show
bias, dishonest character, or defects in a witness' capacity to observe,
remember or recount the matters about which he has testified may in-
(a) Subject to the provisions of Rules 17.5 and 19.4 the prosecuting attorney shall dis-
close to defense counsel, upon timely request. ...
(d) Subject to the provisions of Rule 19.4 the prosecuting attorney shall... disclose to
defense counsel any material or information within his knowledge, possession, or con-
trol, which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant ...
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 19.4 requires that all "information to which a party is entitled must be disclosed
in time to permit his counsel to make beneficial use therefore."
The statements involved in Williamson were descriptions of the assailant in a robbery given to
police officers by the victim and a witness. 263 Ark. at 404, 565 S.W.2d at 416-17. At trial, defense
counsel was denied access to these statements before and after direct testimony. Id at 404, 565
S.W.2d at 416-17. The victim testified that she had not given any description to the police, the
Sheriff admitted that the victim had given him a description, and the witness gave a conflicting
description. Id at 404, 565 S.W.2d at 417. The impeachment value of prior statements given this
sort of testimony is apparent. With respect to the timing of disclosure, the court stated that "[it
seems clear that disclosure in advance of trial does not create any risks for the state inasmuch as
any improper use of the disclosed material is virtually impossible." Id at 405, 565 S.W.2d at 418.
74. See supra notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text.
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86b (1981).
76. See, eg., State v. Gilbert, 36 Conn. Supp. 129, 414 A.2d 496 (1979). The Gilbert court
rejected the defendant's contention that the "subject matter" of the witness' testimony as defined
in § 752 of the 1978 Connecticut Practice Book included any and all out-of-court utterances the
witness may have made "concerning the case." Id at 497. Judge Levine held that under § 752 of
the Practice Book a defendant is not entitled to statements that are merely "incidental" or "collat-
eral." Id (citing United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1964)).
But cf. State v. Hager, 271 N.W.2d 476 (N.D. 1978) (holding that statements of a witness dem-
onstrating bias, interest, or lack of clarity in recollecting events testified to are producible under
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 16). The language of the North Dakota Rule is virtu-
ally identical to that of CoN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86b (1981). For the pertinent test of North Da-
kota Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, see supra note 67.
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peach a witness.77 Yet, witness, statements demonstrating such im-
peaching characteristics frequently do not relate to 'the actual trial
issues.71 A Connecticut defendant, therefore, may be deprived of a val-
uable and legitimate means of discrediting state witnesses.
Ohio and Oklahoma statutes, like the Jencks Act, prohibit disclosure
of witnesses' written or recorded statements until after the witness has
completed direct examination at trial. Both states, however, have en-
acted additional limitations.7 9 Ohio allows delivery of a witness' state-
ment to the defense attorney only if an in camera inspection of the
witness' statement, in the presence of both the defense attorney and the
prosecuting attorney, reveals inconsistencies between the testimony of
the witness and the prior statement.80 If the court determines that in-
consistencies do not exist, the statement is not disclosed to the defense
attorney and he is not permitted to cross-examine or comment upon
it."1 The Oklahoma statute82 does not allow defense discovery of wit-
77, See J. McCORMICK, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 33 (2d ed.
1972).
78. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harm, 474 Pa. 487, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977). TheHamm court
noted that a witness may be impeached through means other than by a demonstration of inconsis-
tencies between prior statements and trial testimony. Such additional "'lines of attack' have the
potential of completely discrediting a ... witness, yet may not relate to matters about which a
witness has testified on direct examination." Id at 500-01, 378 A.2d at 1226. The court therefore
held that "upon request at trial, the defense is entitled to examine in their entirety the prior state-
ments of Commonwealth witnesses which the Commonwealth has in its possession." Id The
court further stated that "[u]pon a showing of good cause by the Commonwealth, the trial court
may issue a protective order limiting the defense right to examine [such] statements. . . ." Id
79. See OHIO R. CIUM. P. 16(B)(l)(g); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2613 (West 1980).
80. OHIO R. Cam. P. 16(B)(1)(g) provides:
Upon completion of a witness' direct examination at trial, the court on motion of the
defendant shall conduct an in camera inspection of the witness' written or recorded state-
ment with the defense attorney and prosecuting attorney present and participating, to
determine the existence of inconsistencies, if any, between the testimony of such witness
and the prior statement.
If the court determines that inconsistencies do not exist the statement shall not be
given to the defense attorney and he shall not be permitted to cross-examine or comment
thereon.
81. See, eg., State v. Ellis, 46 Ohio App. 2d 102, 105, 345 N.E.2d 616, 618 (1975) (defendant
entitled to benefits of Crim. R. 16(B)(1)(g) "whether [his] inquiry discloses the existence of a wit-
ness statement immediately upon the completion of the direct examination or at any other time
during the cross-examination") (emphasis in original); State v. Greer, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 316, 324
(1980) ("patently one cannot participate in a discussion of inconsistencies without being afforded
the opportunity to examine the document in question.").
82. OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 12, § 2613 (West 1980) provides: "In examining a witness concern-
ing a prior statement made by him whether written or not, the statement.. . shall be shown or
disclosed to opposing counsel just prior to cross-examination of the witness."
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ness statements until "just prior to the cross-examination of the
witness."83
The Ohio-type in camera inspection rule84 may be insufficient to
safeguard the defendant's right to cross-examine state witnesses. The
Jencks Court rejected the practice of producing statements to the trial
judge for his determination of relevancy and materiality.85 The Court
stated that the defense alone is capable of determining the value of
prior prosecution witness statements for impeaching Government wit-
nesses.86 Unlike the practice disapproved of in Jencks, however, Ohio
provides for in camera inspection "with the defense attorney and prose-
cuting attorney present and participating."8" Nonetheless, the defense
may not cross-examine or comment on a witness' prior statement if the
court determines that there are no inconsistencies between the state-
ment and the witness' trial testimony.88 A prior statement that demon-
strates bias, for example, is unavailable to the defense for impeachment
purposes if the court finds the statement not to be inconsistent with the
witness' trial testimony. The Ohio defendant may thus be hindered in
discrediting a state witness. 89
The Oklahoma rule' may deny the defense an adequate opportunity
to prepare for cross-examination if the prior statements are indeed de-
livered "just prior to cross-examination." 9' Although a recess follow-
ing production would afford the defense time to prepare for cross-
examination, it would result in trial delay92 and consequent diminished
83. See, e.g., Stafford v. District Court, 595 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. Crim. 1979) (defendant
entitled to receive any sworn statement and a copy of any report used by witness to refresh
recollection).
84. See supra note 80 for the pertinent text of OHiO R. CiuM. P. 16(B)(1)(g).
85. 353 U.S. at 669.
86. Id at 668-69. Justice Brennan noted that "[j]ustice requires no less." Id at 669. As the
United States Supreme Court observed in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969):
An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a
neutral person or event ... may have special significance to one who knows the more
intimate facts of an accused's life. And yet that information may be wholly colorless and
devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances ...
[Tihe task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in
camera judgment of the trial court....
Id at 182.
87. OHto R. CIuM. P. 16(B)(l)(g).
88. Id
89. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
91. For the pertinent text of OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2613 (West 1980), see supra note 82.
92. See supra notes 59, 70 & 71 and accompanying text.
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effectiveness of the defendant's cross-examination. 93
III. DISCOVERY BEFORE DIRECT TESTIMONY
-t. Pretrial Discovery as a Matter of Right
Several professional associations have published standards for re-
form in the area of criminal discovery.94 The American Bar Associa-
tion Standards, for example, identify the objectives and characteristics
of pretrial procedures.95 The ABA Standards suggest that pretrial pro-
cedures should promote expeditious and fair disposition of cases, pro-
vide the accused with sufficient information to make an informed plea,
permit thorough trial preparation and minimize surprise at trial, reduce
interruptions and complications during trial, avoid unnecessary and
repetitious trials, minimize inequities among similarly situated defend-
ants, and effect economies in time, money, judicial resources and pro-
fessional skills. 6 The ABA Standards conclude that these needs can
best be served by full and free discovery, simpler and more efficient
procedures, and procedural pressures to expedite processing of cases.9 7
In keeping with these objectives, the ABA Standards provide that
upon request,98 the prosecutor must disclose to defense counsel, among
other items, the names and addresses of witnesses, together with their
written or recorded statements.99 The ABA notes that experience with
93. See supra notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
ABA STANDARDS]; NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS AsS'N NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
(1977) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS]; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
95. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 94, at Standard 11-1.1(a). By 1975, 22 states had substan-
tially implemented the ABA Standards through formal court rules, legislation, or judicial citation
of the highest state court. Robinson, The ,4B,4 Standardsfor Criminal Justice: What They Mean to
the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 1 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 3, 19 app. (1975).
96. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 94, at 11-1.1(a).
97. Id at 11-1.1(b).
98. The defendant must make a request for prosecution witness statements. The request re-
quirement, which mandates that the defendant particularize the information he desires, avoids
wasteful collection of information by the prosecutor. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 94, at 1 -
2.1(a) commentary at 18.
99. Id at 11-2.1(a)(1). The commentary to Standard 11-2.1(a) enunciates the justifications
for the shift to open file disclosure, which include the changing attitude toward broader discovery
and the availability of protective orders in cases in which the prosecution demonstrates that pre-
trial disclosure may jeopardize persons, evidence or the integrity of the case. See infra note 101
and accompanying text. In addition, the commentary points out that open file disclosure expe-
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broad discovery indicates that in the majority of cases, discovery does
not jeopardize victims, witnesses or evidence. 1 o Thus, the availability
of protective orders provides a sufficient safeguard in cases in which
pretrial disclosures will endanger persons or evidence.10 t Moreover,
the ABA Standards provide for open file disclosure upon defense re-
quest, thereby obviating the need for motions to the court supported by
briefs.0 2 This alone effects a substantial economy in both judicial and
professional time, resources, and skills. 0 3
Similarly, thirteen states allow the defendant access to prosecution
witness statements prior to trial."1o The length of time within which the
prosecutor must disclose such statements before trial, however, varies
among these states.'0 5 For example, while Colorado provides for ac-
dites the processing of cases by eliminating the delays that accompany motion practice and dis-
agreements over the discoverability of particular items. Finally, the commentary argues that open
file disclosure is likely to result in increased finality of convictions due to the reduction of error
which results from inadequate information. UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note 94, at Rule 421(a) and NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 94, at Standard
13.2(A)(1) also provide for disclosure of prosecution witnesses' prior statements.
100. The commentary to ABA Standard 11-2.1(a) cites the comments of the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of California, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, FED-
ERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12.14 (1975). reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 674, 686. ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 94, at 11-2.1(a) commentary at 17 n.7.
101. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 94, at 11-4.4 authorizes the court, upon a showing of cause,
to order that disclosures be restricted, conditioned, or deferred, provided that such disclosures be
made m time to permit the defense adequately to prepare his case.
102. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 94, at 11-2.1(a).
103. The commentary to ABA Standard 11-2.1(a) cites rule 2.04 of the Local Rules of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois as "an excellent example of a
discovery plan that obviates much of the need for judicial intervention." 7TH CIR. N. DIST. ILL.
R. 2.04. (Discovery initiated by oral or written request by defense attorney to prosecutor within
five days after arraignment.) The commentary notes that the successful operation of the Illinois
rule has caused several other districts to adopt similar rules. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 94, at
11-21(a) commentary at 17, n.9.
104. See ARIz. R. CRm. P. 15.1; CoLo. R. CRIM. P. 16; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220; IDAHO CRIM.
R. 16; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 412 (Smith-Hurd 1976); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01; Mo. R. CRIM.
P. 25.03; NJ.R. 3:13-3; N.M.R. CRIM. P. 27; OR. REv. STAT. § 135.815 (1979); R.I.R. CRIM. P. 16;
VT. R. CRIM. P. 16; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7.
Cases applying these statutes include: People v. Smith, 185 Colo. 369, 524 P.2d 607 (1974);
State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 619 P.2d 787 (1980); State v. McCoy, 100 Idaho 753, 605 P.2d 517
(1980); People v. Dunigan, 96 Ill. App. 3d 799, 421 N.E.2d 1319 (1981); People v. Childs, 95 Ill.
App. 3d 606, 420 N.E.2d 513 (1981); People v. Ingram, 91 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 415 N.E.2d 569
(1980); State v. Zeimet, 310 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1981); State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887
(Minn. 1979); State v. Hartfield, 290 Or. 583, 624 P.2d 588 (1981).
105. Arizona: no later than 10 days after arraignment; Colorado: as soon as practicable fol-
lowing the filing of charges against the accused; Florida: after filing of indictment, within fifteen
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cess as soon as practicable following the filing of charges,10 6 New
Jersey requires production by the prosecutor within ten days after a
defense request, which in turn must be made within ten days of the
defendant's entry of his plea.'0 7
Among the states with statutory provisions for pretrial discovery of
witness statements, only Illinois requires a motion on behalf of the de-
fense.' 0 8 The other twelve states allow the defendant to request discov-
ery directly from the prosecutor, 0 9 thus relieving the defense of the
necessity of filing motions for discovery supported by briefs."10 This in
turn relieves the court of the necessity of reading and ruling on routine
discovery motions. The need for judicial supervision of basic discovery
is thereby minimized, effecting reduced expenditure of judicial and
professional time and energy."'
All of these states except Florida and Vermont provide for discovery
of statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor expects or intends to
call at trial." 2 The Florida rule, in contrast, requires the State to dis-
close to the defense the names and addresses of all persons known to
the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to the offense
charged and to any defense.' '3 The Florida rule also mandates that the
days after written demand by defendant; Idaho: at any time following the filing of charges, upon
written request by defendant; Illinois: as soon as practicable following the filing of a motion by
defense counsel; Minnesota: before the date set for omnibus hearing; Missouri: within ten days
after service of request from defendant made not later than twenty days after arraignment; New
Jersey: within ten days after defendant request made within ten days of entry of plea; New Mex-
ico: within ten days after arraignment or date of filing waiver of arraignment; Oregon: as soon as
practicable following filing of indictment or information; Rhode Island: within fifteen days after
service of request made within twenty-one days after arraignment; Vermont: upon plea of not
guilty upon request of defendant in writing or in open court at his appearance under rule 5 or any
time thereafter, Washington: no later than omnibus hearing. For applicable rule and statutory
section numbers, see supra note 104.
106. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16.
107. N.J.R. 3:13-3.
108. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 412 (Smith-Hurd 1976).
109. See supra notes 104-05.
110. The ABA Standards posit the request requirement as a means of "responding to the
increasing pressure to expedite procedures for processing cases in order to comply with speedy
trial requirements." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 94, at 11-2.1(a) commentary at 17.
111. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 104.
113. FLA. R. CiAM. P. 3.220(a)(I)(i). The Florida rule requires an interpretation of the mean-
ing of "relevant." In Jackson v. Wainright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968), the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit defined "relevant" broadly to include exculpatory evidence (habeas corpus pro-
ceeding by party convicted in state court of rape). The Florida District Court of Appeals in State
v. Johnson, 285 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cerl. denied, 289 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), for-
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prosecutor disclose the prior statement of any such person. 14 The Ver-
mont rule similarly requires disclosure of the names and addresses of
all witnesses known to the prosecutor as well as all relevant written or
recorded witness statements within the prosecutor's possession or
control." I 5
B. Pretrial Discovery Within Discretion of Court
Seven states, by statute or procedural rule, expressly leave criminal
discovery of prosecution witness statements to the discretion of the trial
courts, pursuant to some very general guidelines." 6 Unless the State
establishes a paramount interest in nondisclosure, the defendant nor-
mally will be afforded discovery if he sufficiently designates the items
warded a much narrower view, requiring that the witness have knowledge about the defendant's
guilt or an available defense in order to be considered a person having "relevant" information.
Id at 55-56. The Johnson court seemed to place the burden of establishing relevancy justifying
disclosure on the defense. Id The court held that knowledge affecting only possible impeach-
ment or credibility of the substantive witness does not come within the meaning of "relevant." Id
at 56. Although the Johnson court applied former rule 3.220(e) in reaching its holding, the Florida
legislature adopted the same language in its enactment of present rule 3.220(a)(1)(i). Id at 55.
See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220 comment.
114. Id 3.220(a)(l)(ii). The Committee note to the original Florida Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, reprinted in In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124, 151-55 (Fla. 1967),
explains the rationale behind the creation of the rule, as well as its anticipated limitations.
115. VT. R. CriM. P. 16(a)(1).
116. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 rule 13(2)(b)(1) (West 1979) (upon motion of defendant
demonstrating materiality to preparation of defense, or intended for use by state as evidence at
trial); ME. R. CriM. P. 16(c) (upon motion to court showing may be material to preparation of
defense, exhaustion of informal discovery procedures, request reasonable); MD. R. 728 (upon mo-
tion of defendant, material to preparation of defense, request reasonable); MAss. R. CRIM. P.
14(a)(2) (upon motion of defendant, material, relevant); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 46-15-302
(1981) (upon motion of defendant, good cause, material, relevant, necessary to preparation of
defendant's case); PA. R. CIUm. P. 305(a) (upon motion by defendant, material to preparation of
defense, request reasonable); UTAH R. C~iM. P. 16 (upon request once court determines good
cause, needed for adequate preparation of defense). For examples of cases where the court exer-
cised its discretion regarding defendant access to prosecution witness statements, see State v.
Gates, 306 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1981); State v. Mark, 286 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1979); Powell v. State,
23 Md. App. 666, 329 A.2d 413 (1974); Mayson v. State, 238 Md. 283, 208 A.2d 599 (1965); Com-
monwealth v. Wilson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1627, 407 N.E.2d 1229 (1980).
Effective October 7, 1982, South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Circuit Court
include rule 103 entitled "Disclosure in Criminal Cases." Rule 103(a)(2) provides, "The court
shall, on motion of the defendant order the prosecution to produce any statement of the witness in
the possession of the prosecution which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has
testified ... " The rule further provides, however, that "the court may upon a sufficient showing
require the production of any [prosecution witness] statement prior to the time such witness testi-
fies." See R. PRAC. FOR CIR. CT. S.C. 103 (emphasis added).
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he seeks and demonstrates the materiality of these items. 1 7 For exam-
ple, "dragnet" requests, which typically ask for production of all files
for inspection by the defendant for exculpatory, impeaching or incon-
sistent evidence, customarily are denied."' Specification of the items
sought avoids wasteful collection of information by the prosecutor."t 9
In addition, the court may deny, restrict or defer discovery if, for exam-
ple, the State demonstrates that disclosure would result in danger to
witnesses or evidence.'
20
Because discovery decisions in these states are subject only to the
abuse-of-discretion standard on appeal, courts frequently dispose of
discovery issues without articulating the factors they consider in exer-
cising their discretion.' 2' Thus, a trial court may deny requests for dis-
closure simply by stating that discovery is within its discretion.' 22
C. Discovery Before Direct Testimony
Wisconsin, Kentucky, and New York allow discovery of prosecution
witness statements before direct testimony but not before trial. 23 The
1969 Wisconsin statute, which codified pre-existing case law, mandates
disclosure of prosecution witness statements before the witness testifies
on direct examination. 24 The defendant, however, is not allowed ac-
cess to such statements before trial.' 21
117. See supra note 116.
118. See, eg., State v. Mark, 286 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1979).
119. See supra note 98.
120. See rules cited supra note 116.
121. See, e.g., Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 246 A.2d 608 (1968). The defendant's motion for
discovery and inspection requested, among other items, the reports of any experts whom the state
intended to call at trial. Id at 166, 246 A.2d at 613. The court noted that a demand for produc-
tion of documents or statements in the possession or control of the state is within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. Id at 165,246 A.2d at 612. The court summarily disposed of the discovery
issue by stating that because the Maryland rules do not require such disclosure, the lower court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's discovery motion. Id at 166, 246 A.2d at
613.
122. See supra note 121.
123. See Ky. R. CRiM. P. 7.26 (before direct testimony); N.Y. CruM. PROC. § 240.45(1)(a)
(Consol. Supp. 1982) (after jury sworn and before prosecutor's opening address); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.24 (West 1970) (at trial before witness testifies).
124. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.24 (West 1970).
125. See, eg., Sanders v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 242, 263-64, 230 N.W.2d 845, 857 (1975) (affirming
denial of motion for pretrial discovery and distinguishing between pretrial discovery and compul-
sory production of prior statements of a witness during trial) (citing State ex rel Byrne v. Circuit
Court, 16 Wis. 2d 197, 114 N.E.2d 114 (1962)).
In State ex rel. Byrne v. Circuit Court, 16 Wis. 2d 197, 114 N.W.2d 114 (1962), Justice Gordon
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Prior to its amendment, the timing provision of the Kentucky rule'2 6
was identical to that of the Jencks Act. 27 Pursuant to a 1981 statute,
however, the defendant in a Kentucky criminal trial is entitled to dis-
covery of a prosecution witness' statement before the witness' direct
testimony. 128
Effective January, 1980, the New York criminal defendant is entitled
to discovery of prosecution witnesses' prior statements after the jury
has been sworn and before the prosecutor's opening address. 29  In a
nonjury trial, disclosure occurs prior to the presentation of evidence.'30
Before the enactment of the 1980 statute, a New York defendant was
not provided access to prior statements of prosecution witnesses until
the witness had testified at trial.' 3 ' The new timing provision was in-
tended to avoid delays at trial necessitated by postponement of disclo-
sure until after the witness' direct testimony, followed by a recess to
allow the defense adequate time to examine the statements.
32
filed a dissenting opinion noting the absence of a valid basis for distinguishing between discovery
within the trial judge's discretion at the time of the trial and discovery before trial. Id at 198, 114
N.W.2d at 115. Justice Gordon observed that precluding discovery until the trial is underway
results in interruptions to permit the judge to inspect the statements and the defense to examine
them and to compose questions for cross-examination. Id at 199, 114 N.W.2d at 115. In Byrne,
the defendant sought the statement of the prosecuting witness in a statutory rape case. Because
there was little doubt that that witness would be called to testify, the Jencks argument against
pretrial discovery--that statements should be sought only from persons who will be offered as
witnesses and that the identity of those persons is generally not ascertainable until the trial-was
not applicable in Byrne. Id In Justice Gordon's opinion, pretrial discovery would do no disser-
vice to the prosecution and would encourage an orderly trial. Id
126. Ky. R. CrIM. P. 7.26.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1976). For statutory text, see supra note 3.
128. KY. R. CRUm. P. 7.26.
129. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. § 240.45(l)(a) (Consol. Supp. 1980). See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 74
A.D.2d 763, 425 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1980); In re John M., 104 Misc. 2d 725, 430 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y.
Fain. Ct. 1980).
130. N.Y. CIuM. PRec. § 240.45 (Consol. Supp. 1980).
131. Id § 240.10(3)(b) (McKinney 1971) (repealed 1979). The original article 240 exempted
statements of witnesses and prospective witnesses from pretrial discovery. The New York Court
of Appeals adopted the Jencks Act timing of discovery of prosecution witness statements after
direct testimony in People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448,
450, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 866 (1961).
For a discussion comparing original article 240 and new article 240, which became effective
January 1, 1980, see Comment, Criminal Discovery in New York: The Effect ofthe NewArticle 240,
8 FoRDHAm URB. LJ. 731 (1980).
132. See, eg., In re John M., 104 Misc. 2d 725, 430 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980).
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IV. DISCOVERY OF WITNESS STATEMENTS GOVERNED
BY CASE LAW
Discovery of prosecution witness statements is governed primarily by
case law in three states 33 and exclusively by case law in twelve
states. 134
In Nevada, North Carolina, and Texas, statements made by state
witnesses are expressly excluded from statutory provisions authorizing
pretrial discovery upon motion of the defendant. 135 Discovery at trial
in both North Carolina and Nevada, however, is within the discretion
of the trial court.136 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina in State v.
McDougald,137 for example, held that the trial court's denial of the de-
fendant's motion to compel production of any written statements made
by witnesses for the State was not error because the defendant had no
statutory right to the material requested. 138 The court stated that ques-
tions concerning discovery of prior statements of State witnesses must
be resolved by reference to due process principles.1 39
133. Nevada, North Carolina, and Texas each have statutes prohibiting court ordered pretrial
discovery of prosecution witness statements. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. Access to
such statements at trial, however, is governed by case law. See infra notes 136-43 and accompany-
ing text.
134. See infra notes 141-71 and accompanying text.
135. See NEe. REv. STAT. § 174.245 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904(a) (1978); TEx. CrIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 39.14 (Vernon 1966). While these statutes prohibit court ordered pretrial
disclosure, the prosecutor, is free to make voluntary disclosure.
136. See, e.g., Riddle v. State, 96 Nev. 589, 613 P.2d 1031 (1980) (discovery of materials in
possession of state within discretion of trial court); State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567
(1979) (G.S. § 15A-904(a) is an express restriction on pretrial discovery of witness statements that
trial judge has no authority to exceed in discovery order, but subsection (a) does not bar discovery
of such statements at trial); State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977) (absence of dis-
covery as matter of right does not necessarily preclude trial judge from exercising discretion to
order discovery); State v. Miller, 37 N.C. App. 163, 245 S.E.2d 561 (same), cert. denied, 295 N.C.
651, 248 S.E.2d 255 (1978).
137. 38 N.C. App. 244, 248 S.E.2d 72 (1978), appeal dismrsed, 296 N.C. 413, 251 S.E.2d 472
(1979).
138. Id at 254-55, 248 S.E.2d 81.
139. Id at 254, 248 S.E.2d at 81. The court characterized due process concerns as centering
around the issue of whether the undisclosed information might have affected the outcome of the
trial. Id (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)). Defense counsel had received sum-
maries of statements made by the State's witnesses. The defendant contended that those summa-
ries were not adequate because they were neither signed nor initialed by the witnesses. Id at 255,
248 S.E.2d at 81. The court, however, deemed them sufficient to provide the defendant with all
the material testimony expected from each witness and to alert the defendant to any prior state-
ments that might be inconsistent with the witnesses' trial testimony. Id In reaching its holding,
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Texas courts, on the other hand, have adopted the "Gaskin rule."' 4 °
Like the Jencks Act,14 1 this rule mandates that when a prosecution wit-
ness has made a report or statement prior to testifying, the defendant,
pursuant to timely motion or request, is entitled to inspect and use such
prior statement for purposes of impeachment on cross-examination. 42
Delaware courts customarily follow the Jencks rule, looking to fed-
eral court decisions construing the Jencks Act for guidance. 14
Louisana courts require the defense to lay a prior foundation for im-
peachment similar to that rejected in Jencks.'" The Louisiana defend-
ant is not entitled to production of pretrial statements of State witnesses
unless he establishes a proper foundation by demonstrating that the
statements sought contradict the sworn testimony of the witness. 1 In
addition, the defense is entitled to disclosure if the witness denies hav-
ing made the statement."'
In Funk v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held cate-
gorically that a criminal defendant is entitled to discover, prior to trial,
the court noted that there had been no showing of a reasonable likelihood that the addition of
signatures to the statements would have influenced the outcome of the trial. Id
140. Pinson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Gaskin v. State, 172 Tex.
Crim. 7, 353 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
141. For text of Jencks Act, see supra note 3.
142. Additional cases applying the Gaskin rule include Texas Dept. Corrections v. Dalehite,
623 S.W.2d 420 (rex. Crim. App. 1981); Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3067 (1981); Hoffman v. State, 514 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Gilbreath v. State, 500 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
143. See, e.g., Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 200 (Del. 1980) (Supreme Court of Delaware
aflirmed trial court's conclusion that Jencks rule did not compel State to produce summary of
State's witness' prior statement in that summary did not qualify as a "statement" discoverable
under Jencks).
144. See supra note 132 and accompanying text describing the foundation requirement disap-
proved in Jencks.
145. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 302 So. 2d 880, 886 (La. 1974) (copy of report that police officer-
witness consulted prior to trial not available to defendant absent evidence that report was contra-
dictory to officer's sworn testimony); State v. Simon, 131 La. 520, 523-24, 59 So. 975, 976 (1912)
(when witness testified on cross examination that he had testified on two prior occasions and that
his prior testimony had been the same as at trial, defendant not entitled to production of prior
statement for purpose of impeachment because unable to demonstrate any inconsistencies).
146. See, e.g., State v. Lovett, 359 So. 2d 163, 168 (La. 1978) (witness admitted giving prior
statement to police in which he omitted a fact to which he testified at trial, thus defendant not
entitled to production of prior statement); State v. Adams, 302 So. 2d 599, 604 (La. 1974) (defend-
ant not entitled to production of pretrial written statement of a State witness unless witness denies
making statement or defendant shows one or more of material statements therein are contrary to
sworn testimony).
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the statements of prosecution witnesses who will be called at trial.1 47
The court reasoned that there is no sound basis for distinguishing dis-
covery of statements before trial from discovery as a matter of right
during trial.'
48
Mississippi courts leave discovery of prior witness statements within
the trial court's discretion only after the defendant has demonstrated
the materiality and relevance of the prior statement by laying a proper
foundation of inconsistency with direct testimony. 149  Similarly, ac-
cording to Alabama case law, discovery of witness statements is within
the discretionary power of the trial judge, pursuant to a showing by the
defense that the desired statements are essential for purposes of cross-
examination.150
Indiana,15 ' Michigan,'52 Nebraska, 53 New Hampshire 154 and West
Virginia 55 cases leave discovery of prosecution witness statements ex-
cusively within the discretion of the trial court. In a 1974 case, the
Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the authority of the trial court to issue
an order requiring the State to produce statements of its witnesses
147. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959).
148. Id at 424, 340 P.2d at 594.
149. See, e.g., Knowles v. State, 341 So. 2d 913 (Miss. 1977); Armstrong v. State, 214 So. 2d
589 (Miss. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965 (1969).
150. See, e.g., Oliver v. State, 399 So. 2d 941 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Redus v. State, 398 So.
2d 757 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Johnson v. State, 398 So. 2d 393 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).
151. Sexton v. State, 257 Ind. 556, 276 N.E.2d 836 (1972), set forth the criteria for determining
the extent of an Indiana defendant's right to discovery. First, stated the court, the defendant must
sufficiently designate the items he seeks to discover. Second, the item sought must be material to
the defense. Third, if the first two factors are satisfied, the trial court must grant the discovery
motion unless the State makes a showing of paramount interest in nondisclosure. Id at 558-60,
276 N.E.2d at 838-39. In order for a motion to meet the first criterion it must set forth the items
with "reasonable particularity," thus enabling the State to identify what is being requested. Dil-
lard v. State, 257 Ind. 282, 274 N.E.2d 387 (1971). Indiana courts generally hold that a criminal
discovery order is within the discretionary power of the trial judge subject to review only for clear
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 269 Ind. 142, 149, 378 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1978).
152. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 785.1(2) (1963) expressly excludes the application of discovery rules
in criminal cases. A discovery motion, therefore, is addressed to the trial court's sound discretion.
See, e.g., People v. Maranian, 359 Mich. 361, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1970) (discovery ordered when, in
sound discretion of trial judge, the thing to be inspected is admissible in evidence, necessary to
preparation of defense and in interests of fair trial); People v. Browning, 108 Mich. App. 281, 310
N.W.2d 365 (1980) (when defendant's motion for discovery requested all written statements taken
from witnesses and other persons having knowledge, prosecutor not required to furnish taped
interview with key prosecution witness).
153. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying notes.
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before trial.156 The Michigan defendant is entitled to pretrial discovery
of prosecution witness statements if he can set forth specific facts show-
ing that the statements are necessary to the preparation of his de-
fense.' 57 The Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently upheld trial
court rulings denying defendants pretrial access to prior witness state-
ments when the defense counsel obtained the statements at trial.' 58 In
New Hampshire, a criminal defendant's right to compel production of
written statements and reports after indictment is "closely circum-
scribed," ' 9 although the courts have discretion to require production
to prevent manifest injustices."6
In 1975, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia incorpo-
rated a portion of the Jencks Act policy into the common law of West
Virginia.' 61 In State v. Dudick, the court held that once a prosecution
witness has testified from notes used to refresh his recollection, the de-
fense is absolutely entitled to examine those notes and must be afforded
156. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court, 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E.2d 433 (1974). See generally
Joest, Criminal Discovery in Indiana: Its Past and Future, 11 IND. L. REV. 373 (1978).
157. See, e.g., People v. Hayward, 98 Mich. App. 332, 296 N.W.2d 250 (1980) (witnesses' state-
ments material to preparation of defense, trial court failed to suppress evidence of statements
where statements were not turned over to defense pursuant to pretrial order, reversible error);
People v. Nkomo, 75 Mich. App. 71, 254 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (defense failed to convince court that
requested discovery necessary before trial; trial court demed motion but provided for production
at cross-examination, no abuse of discretion); People v. Walton, 71 Mich. App. 478, 247 N.W.2d
378 (1976) (statements especially important for trial preparation when question of credibility may
be preeminent, in camera hearing ordered to determine what material relevant to defense).
158. The Nebraska Supreme Court in 1944 held that discovery by a criminal defendant of
statements in the State's possession lies within the broad discretion of the trial court. Cramer v.
State. 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944). See also State v. Knaff, 204 Neb. 712, 285 N.W.2d 115
(1979) (police report containing a recitation of the alleged facts of the crime by the victim to police
officer given to defendant immediately following victim's testimony, report contained "no confficts
in information.., as shown by the various witnesses," disclosure at trial did not violate pretrial
disclosure order); State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 278 N.W.2d 756 (1979) (no abuse of discretion in
court's overruling of motion to produce prior statements of State witnesses before trial); State v.
Isley, 195 Neb. 539, 239 N.W.2d 262 (1976) (statements given to defense counsel at trial followed
by recess to review, no abuse of discretion in denial of pretrial access).
159. See, e.g., State ex rel McCletchie v. District Court, 106 N.H. 48, 205 A.2d 534 (1968)
(citing State ex rel Regan v. Superior Court, 102 N.H. 224, 153 A.2d 403 (1959)).
160. See State ex rel Regan v. Superior Court, 102 N.H. 224, 229-30, 153 A.2d 403, 406-07
(1959). The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that "j]ustice might be thought to require that
a [defendant] be permitted to inspect the corpse of a victim or an autopsy report [before trial].
Beyond such essential matters, the rights of the accused to inspection in advance of trial do not
go." Id at 230, 153 A.2d at 407. The chances for pretrial discovery of prosecution witnesses'
statements in New Hampshire thus seem slim indeed.
161. State v. Dudick, 213 S.E.2d 458 (W. Va. 1975).
Washington University Open Scholarship
496 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:471
a reasonable opportunity to prepare his cross-examination. 62  The
court stated further, however, that pretrial discovery is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.163
The shortcomings of state decisions that leave defendant access to
prosecution witness statements to the discretion of the trial courts are
readily apparent. The absence of a statute or rule governing the de-
fendant's discovery rights leaves open the possibility of disparate treat-
ment of similarly situated defendants. Because the trial court's order
will be subject to review only for abuse of discretion, both trial and
appellate courts may resolve discovery issues without clearly articulat-
ing the factors considered.' Both defendants and prosecutors may
thus be left without guiding precedent for future cases.
Neither Georgia nor Virginia case law provides for general disclo-
sure of prosecution witness statements even after the witness' direct
trial testimony. Georgia Code section 38-801(g)165 allows a party to
compel production of books, writings, or other documents in the pos-
session of another party. In 1976, the Georgia Supreme Court declared
section 38-801(g) applicable to criminal trials, 66 but subsequently de-
clined an opportunity to establish that that section requires prior wit-
ness statements to be made generally available to the defense.' 67  In
162. Id at 464. Accord State v. Moran, 285 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va. 1975).
163. 213 S.E.2d at 463-64. The liberal discovery policy of Dudick was applied in State v.
Sette, 242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978). In State v. Grimm, 270 S.E.2d 173 (W. Va. 1980), the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that once a trial court grants a pretrial discovery
motion, "non-disclosure by the prosecution is fatal to the prosecution's case where the non-disclo-
sure is prejudicial." Id at 178. Nondisclosure is deemed prejudicial where the defense is "sur-
prised on a material issue and where the failure to make the disclosure hampers the preparation
and presentation of the defendant's case." Id
164. See supra notes 121 & 122 and accompanying text.
165. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-801(g) (Supp. 1982).
166. See Brown v. State, 238 Ga. 98, 231 S.E.2d 65 (1976).
167. See Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 247 S.E.2d 838 (1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).
In Stevens, the witness made a prior statement to the police. The defendant sought discovery of
that statement pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 38-801(g) (Supp. 1982). The State furnished the
defendant with a summary of the statement. The trial court performed an in camera inspection of
the prosecutor's ifies and found nothing exculpatory in the requested statement. The defendant's
discovery request was denied, but the witness was subjected to full cross examination at trial. The
court found no error in the State's failure to produce the statement, and concluded that Brown did
not establish the general availability of witness statements under § 38-801(g). 242 Ga. at 36, 247
S.E.2d at 841. Accord Spain v. State, 243 Ga. 15, 252 S.E.2d 436 (1979); Odom v. State, 156 Ga.
App. 119, 274 S.E.2d 117 (1980); Stanley v. State, 153 Ga. App. 42, 264 S.E.2d 533 (1980).
The only way to test whether Georgia defendants truly have no general right of access to prose-
cution witness statements would be to examine cases involving a requested writ of prohibition
against a trial judge ordering disclosure. If such a writ were granted it would seem that defendant
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Williams v. State,'68 the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's refusal to require the prosecutor to produce witnesses' prior
statements absent a showing that cross-examination based on those
statements might have affected the outcome of the trial.'69
Virginia Supreme Court rule 3A:14 expressly excludes from pretrial
discovery or inspection by the accused statements made by Common-
wealth witnesses or prospective Commonwealth witnesses to agents of
the Commonwealth.'70 Under rule 3A:14, only statements made by the
accused are available.' 7 ' In Be//field v. Commonwealth,'72 the Virgnia
Supreme Court declined to adopt the policy of the Jencks rule and con-
cluded that the defendant had no right to discover written statements
made by a prosecution witness to agents *of the State for purposes of
cross-examination and impeachment after the witness had testified for
the prosecution. 73 Despite this broad language, however, it is note-
worthy that the defense in Belifeld made no attempt to show that the
police notes involved were accurate, verbatim transcripts of the witness'
statement to the police.' 7 4 The result may have been different if such a
showing had been made.' 75
indeed had no right of access. Research has disclosed no such cases. Thus it seems reasonable to
conclude that it is within the trial court's discretion to order or deny disclosure of prosecution
witness statements.
168. 157 Ga. App. 295, 277 S.E.2d 291 (1981).
169. Id at 296, 277 S.E.2d at 292.
170. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:14(b)(2).
171. Id 3A:14(b)(1).
172. 215 Va. 303, 208 S.E.2d 771 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 965 (1975).
173. Id at 307, 208 S.E.2d at 774. Belield, however, involved police notes that the witness
had never seen nor approved. Id The court decided that to use such notes to impeach would be
unfair to the witness. Id The court stressed the importance of vigilance both in protecting the
defendant's right to a fair trial and in maintaining the confidence of the citizens in the police and
prosecuting officers, arguing that to allow discovery of such notes in this case would undermine
that confidence and discourage the testimony of crime victims and "other public-spirited citizens,"
thereby hindering the fair and uniform enforcement of the criminal law. Id See also Hackman v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 261 S.E.2d 555 (1980) (to be discoverable, the accused must give a
statement rather than a witness who heard the accused speak).
174. 215 Va. at 307, 208 S.E.2d at 774.
175. The Belfeld court summarized Ossen v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 902, 48 S.E.2d 204
(1948), in which the trial court was held to have abused its discretion in refusing to require the
production of a written statement signed by a prosecution witness where the Commonwealth had
introduced a part of the statement that proved inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony. 215
Va. at 306, 208 S.E.2d at 773. This precedent suggests that Bel#Feld's broad language may not be
an entirely accurate characterization of Virginia's policy regarding disclosure of prior witness
statements at trial.
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V. CONCLUSION
In formulating a framework for defense discovery of prior statements
of prosecution witnesses courts and legislatures must consider the fol-
lowing factors: the defendant's ability to make an informed plea, 176 the
defendant's ability to thoroughly prepare for trial, 177 minimization of
surprise at trial, 178 economical use of judicial and professional re-
sources, 79 the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, 180
and protection of witnesses.' 8'
Pretrial discovery of prosecution witness statements pursuant to de-
fense request enhances expeditious and fair disposition of criminal
cases.182 For example, pretrial discovery affords defense counsel time
to examine relevant statements and to prepare cross-examination based
on such statements. The defense may find it impossible to adequately
prepare cross-examination during trial recesses, especially in complex
criminal cases. 183  Pretrial discovery thus avoids the risk of cursory
analysis of discovered materials and encourages thorough preparation
for trial.
Moreover, early access to prior witness statements enables the de-
fense to recognize inconsistencies as they may develop during the wit-
176. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
177. Id See, e.g., State v. Williams, 121 Ariz. 218, 589 P.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1978); Carnivale v.
State, 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Chandler v. State, 419 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1981);
People v. Szabo, 55 Ill. App. 3d 866, 371 N.E.2d 117 (1977); People v. Goodman, 55 111. App. 3d
294, 371 N.E.2d 168 (1977);Mayson v. State, 238 Md. 283, 208 A.2d 599 (1965); Powell v. State, 23
Md. App. 666, 329 A.2d 413 (1974); Brunson v. State, 9 Md. App. 1, 261 A.2d 794 (1970); Jackson
v. State, 8 Md. App. 260, 259 A.2d 587 (1969).
178. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
179. Id See generally United States v. Algie, 503 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1980), rev'd, 667
F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Algie, 503 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1980), rev'd, 667 F.2d 569
(6th Cir. 1982). In Algie, the trial court expressly found that criminal defendants "are denied
effective assistance of counsel ... where several defense attorneys are expected to analyze Jencks
Act statements and reports during recesses." Id at 789.
181. See supra notes 15 & 24-25 and accompanying text.
182. Late production of documents requested prior to direct testimony may so seriously im-
pair the defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense as to prevent him from receiving
his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial, which may in turn require reversal of his con-
viction. See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 100 Idaho 753, 605 P.2d 517 (1980) (document, although not
exculpatory on its face, was exculpatory in light of the defense posed by defendant).
183. See, eg., United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (The court noted




ness' direct testimony.' 84 In addition, it avoids delays that inevitably
result from Jencks Act-type recesses 1 5 and that may diminish the effec-
tiveness of cross-examination.1
8 6
As part of a broader scheme of pretrial discovery, early discovery of
prosecution witnesses' prior statements affords the defendant knowl-
edge of the case against him needed to make an informed plea.187 A
guilty plea dispenses with the necessity of a trial, leaving the court free
to hear cases in which the defendant's guilt is substantially at issue. 8
Defense requests directed to the prosecutor should replace formal
motion practice. A request procedure economizes on the use of the
judge's time in reading and ruling on motions as well as the attorney's
time in preparing routine motions and supporting briefs.'8 9
In cases in which the prosecutor can show that disclosure of prior
statements of a particular witness may result in economic harm, physi-
cal injury or other coercion, protective orders should be available. The
trial court should be free to deny or restrict discovery of prior state-
ments to protect the witness. In appropriate cases such protective or-
ders provide adequate safeguards. Jencks Act prohibition of disclosure
in all cases until after direct testimony is overbroad and results in un-
necessary waste of court time when no danger to the prosecution's wit-
nesses can be demonstrated.
Several states have adopted procedures such as the one outlined
above."g The successful operation of such discovery procedures sug-
gests that the rigid timing of the Jencks Act and its state counterparts is
not necessary in all cases. Given the severely overcrowded criminal
dockets of both federal and state courts across the country, pretrial or
at least predirect testimony disclosure of prior statements of prosecu-
184. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
188. See generally Traynor, supra note 9. Judge Traynor noted that "[s]ome federal prosecu-
tors allow the defense extensive pretrial inspection of government evidence. They report that such
inspection not only has expedited trials, but in some cases has convinced the defense of the
strength of the prosecution's case and thereby induced a plea of guilty." Id at 237 (citations
omitted).
189. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text and the discovery plan described in note
100.
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* The prosecutor may disclose prior witness statements, earlier on a voluntary basis.
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